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Abstract 
Although the recent global financial crisis has stimulated a vast amount of research 
on the impact of public debt on economic growth and also increasingly on the role 
of private credit, the total levels of indebtedness of an economy have largely been 
ignored. This paper studies the impact of the total level of and increases in debt-to-
GDP on economic growth for 26 developed countries in the short, medium and 
longer term. We analyse whether we can predict the future level of growth, simply 
by looking at the total level of debt, or increases in that debt level. We find that 
there is a negative correlation between high levels of debt and short term economic 
growth, but that this effect tapers in the medium and long term. Similarly, we find 
that rapid debt accumulation is negatively related to economic growth over the 
short term, the impact is less pronounced over the medium term and is non-
existent over the long term. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars and policy makers agree in general that debt, both public and private, has 
played an important role in the build up to the recent global financial crisis (e.g. 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, Mian and Sufi, 2014). An increasing number of 
researchers assert that the high levels of debt commonly found in developed 
economies, play an important role in the subsequent slow recovery (e.g., Reinhart, 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2012 and Chatterjee, 2013). 
One important strand of research looks into the role of public debt in destabilizing 
an economy. When there are increasing doubts about the fiscal sustainability of a 
country, households and corporations anticipate future elevated taxes, which 
results in reduced consumption and investment1. Subsequently, as the risk of a 
default increases, government debt holders will demand higher interest rates, 
which makes it even harder for a government to service its debt. This point of view 
has dominated public policy – and research – in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis. An excellent illustration is the preeminence of austerity measures to deal 
with the outfall of the global financial crisis, both in Europe and in the United States 
and advocated by international institutions such as the IMF (e.g. IMF, 2010). 
Only in the last few years, research has looked into the role of private debt, or 
credit2, on economic growth (e.g. Taylor and Corrado, 2012). Previously, the 
narrative of hyperrational private households and companies who make decisions 
in their own interest that also benefit society as a whole, had prevailed. Moreover, 
as net world debt is zero, the consensus view was that losses to creditors are 
automatically cancelled out by gains to debtors. The fallout of the collapse in house 
prices in the United States in 2007 clearly proved this assumption to be erroneous. 
Little research, however, has been pursued on the impact of the total level of debt3 
on an economy. Nevertheless, public debt and private credit are interlinked. One 
example is provided by the recent bailouts of the financial sector in Spain. As 
shown in Figure 1 below, simply focusing on the level of public debt-to-GDP would 
erroneously give the impression that Spain did not have a problem of excessive 
debt in the run-up to the global financial crisis, as it strictly adhered to the 
Maastricht criterion of public debt levels of below 60%. Simultaneously however, a 
large construction bubble was building up, as private debt levels soared from 
around 125% of GDP at the start of the decade to more than 220% when the crisis 
struck in 2007-2008. Hence, if in case of failure of the private sector the public 
sector steps in, it can be argued that this amounts to an implicit government 
guarantee, making private debt indistinguishable from public debt (Bhandari, 
Haque and Turnovsky, 1990). The recent financial crisis has indeed shown, both in 
the United States and in Europe, the willingness of the sovereign to stand behind 
its banking sector. Investors considered too-big-to-fail banks as creditworthy as the 
government of its host country. These financial institutions could borrow at near 
identical rates as the sovereign, which made their debt very similar to sovereign 
debt (see e.g. Schich and Lindh, 2012). 
Similarly, a narrow focus on the level of public debt would suggest that the US 
economy is in dire straits as its public debt-to-GDP levels skyrocketed from 53% in 
                                                                                                         
1 This line of thinking is heavily influenced by the Ricardian equivalence theorem which states that 
consumers take the budgetary constraints of the government into account when making consumption 
decisions (Barro, 1996). Consequently, higher budget deficits now result in higher taxation in the future. 
Forward looking consumers anticipate this and hence increase their savings to pay for these higher 
taxes. 
2 In the remainder of this paper, private debt and credit will be used interchangeably. 
3 In this article, we define the total level of debt in an economy as the sum of gross general government 
debt and private credit to households and non-financial companies. We exclude interbank lending in our 
analysis. 
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2000 to close to 103% in 2012. On the other hand, American households and 
companies managed to deleverage after the crisis – albeit by a relatively small 
amount – which is likely to be beneficial for the long run sustainability of its 
economy. 
Figure 1 - Evolution of public and private debt: examples 
 
At a more fundamental level, Schmidt (1943) asserted that public and private debt 
are essentially equivalent. An argument which was further elaborated by Buchanan 
(1958). The latter challenged the dominant theory on the distinction between public 
and private debt which hinges on the claim that private debt repayment represents 
a reduction in private net worth of the individual, but that public debt repayment 
does not constitute a reduction in the cumulative wealth of the community. 
However, when the taxpayer is taxed for servicing the public debt, this reduces his 
net worth, which is quite similar to private debt – and interest – repayments. This 
reduction in net worth must be offset, not against the increase in net worth enjoyed 
by the bondholder, but against the productivity of the public investments which are 
financed by the debt. Indeed, the increase in net worth of the bondholder will take 
place, regardless of the productivity of the public project. It follows that the taxpayer 
(i.e. the public borrower) is at no time in a different position from the private 
borrower. If the latter invests foolishly, his real income is reduced when interest 
payments are due. Similarly, if the state uses borrowed funds in an ill-advised way, 
this reduces the aggregate wealth of the community (Bhatt, 1959). 
Backhaus and Wagner (2006) make a similar claim, stating that “public debt is just 
a particular form of private debt, where the borrower is especially powerful”. 
Whereas a private citizen, responding to an unexpected drop in income, might 
borrow to smooth out this decline in spending power, so might the sovereign 
increase its borrowing when confronted with falling revenues, for example due to a 
recession. Both for the sovereign and the private citizen, debt does not alter its net 
worth; it simply affects the timing of expenditure.  
Public and private debt are not only interlinked and should therefore be examined 
simultaneously, they are also often interchangeable and should in many cases thus 
be aggregated to fully appreciate the extent to which debt has an impact on the 
economy. Tuition fees for higher education exemplify this reasoning. A college 
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
Pr
iv
at
e 
de
bt
 a
s 
%
 o
f G
D
P
40
50
60
70
80
90
Pu
bl
ic
 d
eb
t a
s 
%
 o
f G
D
P
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Public debt Spain
Private debt Spain
Spain
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
Pr
iv
at
e 
de
bt
 a
s 
%
 o
f G
D
P
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
Pu
bl
ic
 d
eb
t a
s 
%
 o
f G
D
P
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Public debt US
Private debt US
US
Vanlaer, Marneffe, Vereeck, Van Overtveldt ● Does debt predict growth? 
82 
education entails certain costs (e.g. paying salaries to teachers, building the 
necessary infrastructure). Whether these costs are borne by the state, by providing 
free higher education, or by the students by paying full cost fees, does not change 
this fact4. So, it may follow that either the government has to take on debt in order 
to finance higher education, or that the individual has to take on a student loan to 
pay for school.  
A similar argument can be made for the provision of health care, which can be 
arranged by the state, e.g. in the form of single-payer healthcare, or via private 
insurers. Likewise, governments can choose to outsource the exploitation of public 
infrastructure, such as toll roads, to private partners in exchange for co-financing of 
the initial investment. In essence, these are basically transfers on the same side of 
a consolidated balance sheet of the society. Arguments on who – the public or the 
private sector - should pay may depend on cost efficiency5 or ideology6. However, 
they do not alter the overall need for financing these projects and services. 
Public debt and private credit are therefore communicating vessels and should not 
be analysed separately. Focusing on only one is likely to yield a distorted view of 
the level indebtedness in and its impact on an economy. Therefore, this paper 
studies the link between the total level of debt-to-GDP, and changes in that level, 
and economic growth. We analyse whether we can predict the future level of 
growth, simply by looking at the total level of debt, or increases in that debt level. 
2. Review of literature 
The debate on the relationship between public debt and economic growth was 
revived by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), which was part of a much larger empirical 
analysis they performed in their book This time is different: eight centuries of 
financial folly (2009). Their methods are temptingly straightforward. Reinhart and 
Rogoff group country-years in four categories by public debt-to-GDP ratios: 0-30 
percent, 30-60 percent, 60-90 percent, and more than 90 percent. Next, they 
compare real GDP growth rates across these different groups. They find that this 
relationship is rather weak for public debt-to-GDP ratios below a threshold of 90%. 
For debt levels above 90%, however, median growth rates go down by around one 
percent and average growth falls even more. This has subsequently been referred 
to as the nonlinear relationship between public debt and economic growth (Minea 
and Parent, 2012).  
Afterwards, in a critical attempt to replicate the results of Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
2009 paper, Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2014) uncovered “data omissions, 
questionable methods of weighting and elementary coding errors”. They assert 
that, when these errors are corrected, average growth at public debt levels above 
the 90% threshold does not vary dramatically from average growth at lower debt 
levels. 
In a study by Woo and Kumar (2015), the impact of the initial debt-to-GDP level on 
subsequent GDP growth was explored. They authors find that a 10 percentage 
point increase in the initial public debt level reduces GDP per capita by around 0.2 
percentage points a year. 
                                                                                                         
4 Of course, one can argue that a private institution is better managed than a college that is run by the 
state and that thus the total cost for society is lower in the former case, but that discussion is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
5 In some instances, it may be more efficient if the state pays for a particular service (e.g. health care), 
while in – many - other case the private market produces more efficient outcomes (e.g. telecoms 
services). 
6 Some people simple prefer a smaller or a larger state than others. 
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Baum, Checherita-Westphal, and Rother (2013) analysed the impact of public debt 
on GDP in the EMU by using a dynamic threshold panel methodology. They 
identify an inverse u-shaped relationship between public debt and growth as their 
findings suggest that the short-run impact of debt is positive, decreases to zero at a 
public debt/GDP ratio of around 67% and is significantly negative at debt ratios 
above 90%. 
Critics of the original Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) paper reply that, while there may 
very well be a negative relationship between public debt and economic growth, the 
effect works in the opposite direction to what the supporters of austerity claim. It is 
low growth that causes the state revenues to fall and public expenditures to rise, 
thus resulting in a higher level of public debt.  
Lof and Malinen (2014) tried to tackle the issue of reverse causality by using panel 
vector autoregressions that represent the dynamic relationship between GDP and 
public debt, decomposing cause and effect. They indeed conclude that the 
negative correlation between both variables is mainly driven by the impact of 
economic growth on sovereign debt, not the other way around. 
A recent paper by three economists at the IMF research department (Pescatori, 
Sandri and Simon, 2014) refuted the existence of debt thresholds after which 
economic growth significantly deteriorates. They used a novel empirical approach 
to determine the relationship between debt thresholds and growth prospects. More 
specifically, they take a sample of all episodes where public debt increases above 
a particular threshold and calculate real GDP growth per capita over the following h 
years, varying h from 1, 5, 10 to 15. Although their method is quite similar to the 
one applied by Reinhart and Rogoff (2012), it differs in two crucial aspects. Firstly, 
the range of debt thresholds being analysed is much broader than the 90 percent 
threshold on which the Reinhart and Rogoff paper focuses. Secondly, economic 
growth over a particular time span is analysed, regardless of the debt outcome. In 
contrast, Reinhart and Rogoff only consider the period when debt persists above a 
certain threshold. 
Taylor (2012) illustrated the importance of private credit in developed economies. 
He argues that past growth in private debt contains predictive information about the 
likelihood of a crisis occurring in the future. Moreover, he finds that the recession 
after a credit boom is more severe than a “normal” recession. 
Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2013) built on this work by analyzing the co-evolution 
of sovereign debt and credit in developed countries. They find that the risks to 
economic and financial stability mainly come from booms in private debt rather 
than increases in public debt. Nevertheless, when a country enters a crisis period 
with an already elevated level of public debt, this intensifies the crisis, presumably 
by the limited ability to introduce fiscal stimulus to uphold aggregate demand. 
A paper by Randveer, Uusküla and Kulu (2011) researched the link between 
economic recovery after a crisis and growth of credit before a crisis. They find, 
quite counterintuitively, that rapid credit expansion before a crisis is related with 
higher economic growth after the crisis. This contrasts with the widespread belief 
that, after a crisis and especially after a balance sheet recession like the one we 
have recently experienced, household debt overhang and the subsequent process 
of deleveraging acts as a serious drag on economic recovery. 
That is also precisely what Gärtner (2013) found in her study of the Great 
Depression. Debt overhang of households was indeed an important factor in 
holding back the economic recovery after the very severe drop in output that 
followed the stock market crash of October, 1929.  
In their widely praised book House of Debt (2014), Atif Mian and Amir Sufi provided 
compelling evidence for the case that the buildup of household debt was the main 
culprit for the recent recession. Additionally, when they analyse previous economic 
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downturns, the increase in consumer debt often plays a very important role. They 
conclude that the bigger the increase in debt, the harder the fall in spending. 
Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011) analysed government debt, corporate debt 
and household debt and find that each of these three types of debt becomes a drag 
on growth when it reaches a level above 85-90% of GDP. They conclude that debt 
improves welfare but can be damaging to the economy when levels are very high. 
As mentioned, the initial response to the global financial crisis was to focus on 
excessive government debt. Afterwards, the focus shifted to private credit. Our 
study aims to further the literature by looking at the overall debt level in an 
economy. This paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between total 
debt and economic growth. We explore whether there is a specific debt threshold 
after which growth plummets. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used 
in our analysis. In section 4, we provide empirical evidence on the link between 
total debt levels and growth for our panel of 26 OECD countries from 1961-2012 in. 
Section 5, analyses changes in total debt-to-GDP and real GDP growth. In the 
subsequent section, we discuss our main findings. Finally, section 7 presents the 
conclusions. 
3. Data and methodology 
We have gathered data on public debt levels from a comprehensive database on 
gross government debt, which is compiled by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department7. 
Data on private debt comes from a recent BIS database8 on credit to the private 
non-financial sector. We acquire GDP data from the AMECO database of the 
European Commission. Our dataset comprises annual data on 26 developed 
economies, over the period 1961-2012.  
Table A in the Appendix provides the summary statistics for public, private and total 
debt-to-GDP levels, yearly increases in total debt-to-GDP levels and real GDP per 
capita growth rates. In our sample, the average total debt-to-GDP level is 168%, 
the average yearly increase in debt is 3.65% and average real growth equals 
2.48%. However, these averages disguise large discrepancies between countries. 
Whereas countries like Turkey and Mexico have average total debt-to-GDP levels 
of around 70%, countries such as Japan and Luxembourg9 have an average debt 
level which is several times larger (363% and 257% respectively). 
We need to discuss several methodological issues when examining the 
relationship between debt and growth. Firstly, it seems highly implausible that there 
is one common debt threshold after which growth plummets. If there exists a 
“dangerous” debt threshold, this will most likely vary across countries and across 
time, and will be dependent on numerous other factors (e.g. potential growth rate10, 
willingness to save of the private sector).  
Another issue pertains to the causality between debt and growth. Rather than 
being the cause, high debt may be the result of anaemic growth. If it is sluggish 
growth that causes high debt, it is less probable that a specific threshold is 
                                                                                                         
7 See Horton et al. (2010) for a complete description of the database, which can be found online on 
www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=DEBT. 
8 See Dembiermont, Drehmann and Muksakunratana (2013) for a detailed description of the database: 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/credtopriv.htm. 
9 Luxembourg is a particular case due to its heavy reliance on financial services, resulting in a very high 
level of private debt. 
10 As Summers (2014) has argued repeatedly in his discussion of secular stagnation, in a world with 
economic output chronically below potential, debt-financed public projects might be needed to generate 
growth levels which are consistent with full employment and stable inflation.  
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discerned. Hence, if such a threshold is found, the likelihood that it is driven by a 
causal effect of debt on growth is relatively high. 
Moreover, elevated debt levels might conceal an omitted variable, a common factor 
both increasing debt and reducing growth (e.g. a financial crisis or a war). This 
applies particularly when analyzing the short-term relationship between debt and 
growth, since a recession almost mechanically results in a higher debt ratio due to 
the denominator shrinking.  
One way to address the issue of causality is by adopting instrumental techniques. 
For example, Panizza and Presbitero (2014) use an instrument variable that takes 
into account valuation effects resulting from the interplay between exchange rate 
volatility and foreign currency debt. They find no evidence that debt has a causal 
effect on growth.  
Next to the short-term relationship between debt and growth, which is the focus in 
most of the literature, we consider the long-term link. More concretely, we analyse 
the long-term relationship between today’s level of total debt to GDP, bt, and 
subsequent GDP growth in the next h-years, git (h) = yt+h/yt. This longer-term 
horizon allows for tempering the effects of reverse causality that a brief recession 
or boom might have on short-term economic growth. 
We apply the framework provided by Pescatori, Sandri and Simon (2014). Our 
analysis starts by taking a sample of all country episodes11 where total debt rose 
above a threshold τ. Next, we look at real GDP per capita growth over the next h 
years, where h ϵ [1,5,10,15]. Countries can have multiple episodes, but not 
overlapping ones. We consider the start of a rising debt episode to be the first year 
in which the total debt level exceeds the threshold τ, conditional on the level being 
below the threshold in the previous year. To put it more formally, for a country i and 
a threshold τ, the start of an episode has to meet the following conditions:  
bit ≥ τ, bit-1 < τ and ∄ j ϵ [1,…,h] s.t. bit-j ≥ τ, bit-j-1 < τ. 
There are several features of this model which are important to note. Firstly, by 
analyzing economic performance over a given period regardless of the debt 
outcome, we avoid the truncation problem which arises when we only look at the 
period when debt remains above a certain level, in effect solely selecting ‘failures’. 
In our analysis, we admit countries that succeed in reducing total debt levels after 
surpassing a particular debt threshold along with the ‘failures’, i.e. countries whose 
debt level remains elevated. Secondly, we allow each country to only have a 
limited number of episodes, due to the fact that we rule out overlapping episodes 
and by requiring that an episode starts when total debt exceeds the threshold from 
below. When calculating averages, the episodes are pooled together and weighted 
equally12. Finally, in contrast to the growth regressions adopted in most other 
papers, our methodology does not impose a linear relationship between debt and 
economic growth. 
4. Total debt levels and economic growth 
4.1. Short-term (1 year) 
Our analysis starts with the short-term relationship between the total debt level and 
economic growth. In Figure 2, we present the average real GDP per capita growth 
rate in the year after the total debt level exceeds a certain threshold, i.e. h=1. More 
                                                                                                         
11 A country episode is a combination of h consecutive country years (cf. supra). 
12 The methodology adopted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) resulted in several countries having a lot 
more observations than other countries. Alternative weighting methods can subsequently bring about 
significantly different conclusions.   
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precisely, we show a scatterplot of all the observations, plotting economic growth 
against total debt-to-GDP. We also include a locally fitted regression function13. We 
can observe that there are countries with higher debt which experience sound 
growth rates. Reversely, there are countries with lower debt levels and that display 
limited or even negative economic growth14. In general, however, a higher level of 
debt leads to lower economic growth, but this relationship becomes less 
pronounced at very high total debt levels. In addition, a Spearman's correlation was 
calculated to determine the relationship between debt and growth. It showed there 
was moderate, negative monotonic correlation between the two variables (ρ = -
0.42). 
Figure 2 - Total debt and short-term economic growth 
 
 
4.2. Medium- and longer-term (5, 10 and 15 years) 
However, it would be ill-advised to draw conclusions about the link between total 
debt and economic growth simply by analysing the year after a particular debt 
threshold is exceeded. The reason for this is straightforward; instead of increased 
debt leading to lower growth, the relation could run the other way, i.e. lower growth 
resulting in higher debt levels. This argument has been extensively discussed by 
critics of the original Reinhart and Rogoff paper (2009) (see e.g. Herndon, Ash and 
Pollin, 2013 and Pescatori, Sandri and Simon, 2014). When growth significantly 
slows down, and the economy enters into a recession, government revenues 
decline, e.g. due to a fall in personal taxes and income taxes. Similarly, 
governement expenditures increase, as more people rely for instance on 
unemployment insurance. Absent severe cuts in spending on other policy areas – 
                                                                                                         
13 The locally smoothed regression function is estimated with the general additive model with integrated 
smoothness estimation using the gamfit package in Stata. 
14 Our methodology can produce multiple observations for one country-year. For example, if a country’s 
total debt level jumps from 100% to 115% in one year, multiple thresholds (e.g. 102%, 104%, 106%, 
etc.) will be exceeded. 
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which would deepen the recession – this results in a larger budget deficit and 
consequently a higher level of government debt. Correspondingly, job losses 
caused by the recession render households less able to service their debt, which in 
the short run makes it very hard to deleverage. Some households will even have to 
take on additional loans in order to make ends meet. In summary, when economic 
growth slows down, or even becomes negative, the debt-to-GDP ratio almost 
mechanically increases; debt (i.e. the numerator) soars due to lower revenues and 
higher expenditures as GDP (i.e. the denominator) shrinks.  
We try to eliminate the bias which potentially arises from reverse causality as well 
as mitigate the effects of outliers by extending the horizon of our analysis. If high 
levels of total debt in an economy significantly hold back growth over the medium 
to long term, we would foresee that growth is not only supressed in the first year 
that debt surpasses the threshold, but also in the ensuing years. 
Figure 3 shows economic growth over 5, 10 and 15 years respectively after a 
certain debt threshold has been reached15. To complete the picture, we have 
added the results from our previous analysis, i.e. short-term growth. When looking 
at economic growth over a 5-year horizon, the result of our previous analysis is 
confirmed; more debt results in lower growth. Although growth performance 
improves noticably in the longer run, higher debt levels are still related to a lower 
growth rate. This is confirmed by Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which 
declines from -0.45 for 5-year growth to -0.20 for growth over a 15-year horizon, 
which is a rather weak correlation. Additionally, we compared the regression 
coefficients among these four groups to test the null hypothesis: 
H0: B1 = B2 = B3 = B4 
where B1 is the regression for 1-year growth, B2 for 5-year growth, B3 for 10-year 
growth, and B4 for 15-year growth. Our analysis reveals that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected (F=105.07, p = 0.0000). This means that the regression 
coefficients between debt and growth do significantly differ across the 4 groups (1 
year, 5 year, 10 year, 15 year). We also tested the regression coefficients between 
two groups pairwise (e.g. comparing 10-year growth with 15-year growth). All 
regression coefficients significantly differ from each other (p = 0.0000). 
Figure 3 - Total debt and medium- to long-term economic growth 
 
As a robustness test, we have rerun our analysis on a homogenous set of data. 
Whereas we varied our exclusion window in Figure 3 in correspondence with the 
period over which we calculate the average growth rate (e.g. the exclusion window 
for h=1is 2012 and for h=15 is 1998), in Figure 4 the exclusion window is the same 
for each curve, i.e. 1998. In other words, each of the four graphs looks at the exact 
same debt episodes; only the period over which economic growth is averaged, 
                                                                                                         
15 The exclusion window for the different horizons depends on the level of h, i.e. for h=1/5/10/15 we look 
at episodes until 2012/2007/2002/1997. 
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varies. The results are strikingly similar, with Spearman’s rank correlation varying 
from -0.40 to -0.20. 
 
Figure 4 - Total debt and medium- to long-term economic growth (homogenous 
dataset) 
 
Of course, our study could be influenced by outliers. For example, several 
episodes of very low growth might skew our results. Therefore, in Figure 5 we 
repeat our analysis, but eliminate the observations with 2.5% lowest and 2.5% 
highest growth levels16. Our previous results remain unaltered. In the short term, 
there is a relatively strong negative correlation between debt and growth, but this 
correlation attenuates when growth over a longer period is taken into consideration. 
Figure 5 - Total debt and medium- to long-term economic growth (outliers 
removed) 
 
Comparing the impact of public debt and private debt levels is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the general relationship 
between total debt and growth – relatively strong negative correlation in the short 
term, much less so on the long term – also holds for public and private debt, as can 
be seen in Figure 6. However, the strength of the negative relationship with growth 
is more pronounced for private debt than for public debt. 
                                                                                                         
16 We get similar results if we eliminate only the 1.25% highest and lowest values or if we eliminate the 
5% highest and lowest values. 
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Figure 6 - Public debt & private debt levels and medium- to long-term economic 
growth 
 
 
4.3. Debt trajectory 
Hitherto, our analysis has focused solely on episodes where the total debt level has 
exceeded a threshold. Now, we look at the impact of decreasing total debt levels 
on economic growth. Therefore, we study all episodes where the total debt level 
declines below a given threshold: 
bit ≤ τ, bit-1 ˃ τ and ∄ j ϵ [1,…,h] s.t. bit-j ≤ τ, bit-j-1 ˃ τ. 
In Figure 7, we compare short-term economic growth (h=1) in these episodes with 
the ones identified in Figure 2. We can observe that the trajectory of growth 
performance is quite similar between countries that exceed or fall below a debt 
threshold. Yet countries on a declining debt path have slightly higher growth rates 
at high debt levels compared to those on an increasing path. In other words, high 
levels of debt are negatively associated with growth, but if these high debt levels 
are falling, growth performance improves slightly. In addition, when debt is falling, 
there appears to be no impact on growth until debt levels reach 200% of GDP, after 
which real GDP growth steadily deteriorates. 
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Figure 7 - Debt trajectory and short-term economic growth 
 
Figure 8 presents the results for h=15.17 We now find that the evolution of 
economic growth is very similar for countries with increasing and decreasing debt 
levels. Higher levels of debt are still correlated with somewhat lower growth, but 
there is no impact on economic performance stemming from the increase or 
decrease of debt levels. 
                                                                                                         
17 We get similar results for h=5 and h=10. 
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Figure 8 - Debt trajectory and long-term economic growth 
 
5. Changes in total debt levels and economic growth 
5.1 General 
In our previous analysis, we have found that in the short term, high total debt levels 
in an economy are correlated to lower economic growth, but the effect becomes 
less pronounced in the the medium and long run. Moreover, we have concluded 
that the debt trajectory has little to no impact on growth. In this section, we evaluate 
whether changes in debt levels have a significant impact on GDP per capita 
growth. Heretofore, we have looked at the stock of debt; we will now scrutinize debt 
flows. 
5.2 Short-term (1 year) 
In Figure 9, we plot the average growth rate of countries the year after they 
reached a particular change in total debt level θ, that is18:  
bit – bit-1 = θ. 
The graph does show that a rapid accumulation of debt is correlated with lower 
economic growth, but the relationship is rather weak. This is also confirmed by 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which is only -0.08. 
 
                                                                                                         
18 The reason why we use “=” in this part of our analysis instead of “≥” is twofold. Firstly, we have 
positive as well as negative values for θ, which renders the notion of “exceeding a certain threshold” 
less straightforward to interpret. Secondly, if we would use “≥”, then exceeding a threshold of e.g. 1% 
would imply that we use all observations not just where there is a debt increase of 1%, but also where 
debt increases by 2%, 3%, 4%, etc. This way, certain thresholds would have hundreds of observations, 
which would make our analysis rather meaningless. 
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Figure 9 - Change in total debt and short-term economic growth 
 
We now extend our analysis in two ways. Firstly, we look at changes in total debt-
to-GDP levels over multiple years d, with d ϵ [1,5,10,15]. Secondly, we study the 
growth performance of countries over the medium to long term h, with h ϵ 
[1,5,10,15]: 
bit – bit-d = θ and ∄	j	ϵ	[1,…,h] s.t. bit-j – bit-d-j = θ. 
Figure 10 shows short-term economic growth (h=1) and debt accumulated over 1, 
5, 10 and 15 years (i.e. d=1,5,10,15).  
Figure 10 - Growth performance over 1 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year    
(h=1 and d=1,5,10,15) 
 
Firstly, the graphs show that a rapid accumulation of debt is associated with lower 
growth. All four curves have a negative slope. It can be observed that this 
correlation is not particularly strong, as shown by Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient, which never exceeds -0.17. Secondly, the period of time over which 
debt has been built up matters. Logically, an increase in the total debt-to-GDP level 
of 20% over 1 year is more negatively correlated to growth than a 15 year building 
up period. Thirdly, whereas deleveraging (i.e. negative values of changes in total 
debt-to-GDP levels) does not appear to impact growth, economic performance 
starts to deteriorate as debt accumulates (i.e. positive values of changes in total 
debt-to-GDP levels). This holds for all four curves. The threshold for which growth 
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starts to slow down, increases as the period over which debt is accumulated is 
extended. For example, economic performance remains quite constant for d=5 until 
a 25% increase in debt. For d=15, an increase in debt of 50% must be reached 
before we see a negative impact on growth. Finally, all regression coefficients were 
compared and found to be significantly different across the four groups (p = 
0.0000). Again, our analysis does not change if we exclude the 2.5 lowest and 
2.5% highest values of growth, as shown in Appendix C. 
When comparing the difference between public and private debt, it is noteworthy 
that private debt again has the strongest negative correlation with economic 
growth, as can be seen in Figure 11. 
Figure 11 - Growth performance over 1 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year    
(h=1 and d=1,5,10,15) – Public & private debt 
 
 
5.3. Medium-term (5 years) 
From the analysis so far, we cannot conclude that the causal direction runs from 
the accumulation of debt to sluggish growth. As argued, a period of low growth may 
result into a rapid build-up of debt. In addition, an increase in debt in the order of 
magnitude of over 10% in one year is very likely to be accompanied by a severe 
crisis, which in itself slows down growth. Therefore, we will analyse the link 
between debt accumulation and medium- to long-term growth. 
In Figure 12, we provide the results for economic growth over 5 years (h=5) after 
reaching a threshold change in total debt levels, that has been accumulated over 1, 
5, 10 and 15 years (i.e. d=1,5,10,15) respectively.  
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Figure 12 - Growth performance over 5 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year    
(h=5 and d=1,5,10,15) 
 
Again, we find that the period over which debt is accumulated is relevant. The 
shorter this period, the more negative the economic growth. However, this 
relationship is much less strong in the medium term than in the short term. When 
debt has been built up over 10 or 15 years, the relationship becomes practically 
non-existent19.This is supported by Spearman’s rank correlation, which is a mere -
0.06 for d=10 and 0.03 for d=15 and fails to be statistically significant (p=0.09 and 
0.49 respectively). Hence, there appears to be no negative impact of a large 
increase in debt compared to a smaller increase in debt, when debt is built up over 
an extended period. These outcomes do not change when we exclude outliers, as 
shown in Appendix D. 
There is a clear difference between public and private debt. Accumulation of public 
debt is not negatively correlated with medium-term growth; Spearman’s rank 
correlation is positive and ranging between 0.10 and 0.20. In contrast, a negative 
relationship between private debt accumulation and medium-term growth is 
observed and verified by Spearman’s rank correlation, which ranges between -0.16 
and -0.22. 
Figure 13 - Growth performance over 5 years with debt accumulation over 1-15 
year    (h=1 and d=1,5,10,15) – Public & private debt 
 
                                                                                                         
19 The null hypothesis that both coefficients are the same also could not be rejected (p=0.09). 
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5.4. Long-term (15 years) 
Finally, Figure 14 presents the results of our analysis on growth performance over 
a 15 year horizon (h=15) 20 and debt accumulating over 1, 5, 10 and 15 years 
(d=1,5,10,15). We find that countries experiencing a significant increase in their 
total debt level do not record worse economic performances over the longer term 
than countries with a constant or declining total debt level. If anything, there is a 
slightly positive relationship between debt accumulation and longer term growth; 
Spearman’s rank correlation is positive for all four curves and ranges between 0.01 
and 0.13. Appendix H demonstrates that we get similar results once extreme 
values are removed.  Moreover, we compared the regression coefficients among 
the four groups. They do not siffer significantly (F=1.36, p=0.2540), which means 
that the period over which debt is accumulated is not relevant. The regression 
coefficients between two groups were also compared pairwise (e.g. comparing 
debt accumulation over 1 year with debt accumulation over 10 years). The null 
hypothesis could not be rejected for any comparison. 
Figure 14 - Growth performance over 15 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 
year    (h=15 and d=1,15)  
 Figure 15 shows that there is hardly any difference in the correlation between debt 
and long-term growth between public debt and private debt, with the only exception 
being public debt accumulated over 1 year.  
                                                                                                         
20 The analysis for economic growth over a 10 year period yields similar results, as can be seen from 
Appendices E-G. 
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Figure 15 - Growth performance over 15 years with debt accumulation over 1-15 
year    (h=15 and d=1,5,10,15) – Public & private debt 
 
 
6. Discussion of results 
Although the recent global financial crisis has produced a vast amount of research 
on the impact of public debt on economic growth and increasingly also on the role 
of private credit, the total levels of indebtedness of an economy have largely been 
ignored. Our paper for the first time attempts to fill that void by analysing the link 
between total debt-to-GDP levels and economic growth for a panel of 26 OECD 
countries between 1961 and 2012. We investigate whether we can predict the 
future level of growth, simply by looking at the total level of debt, or increases in 
that debt level. 
We found little evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a critical threshold 
of the total debt-to-GDP ratio above which economic growth plummets. Rather, 
growth performance worsens gradually as debt levels rise. In addition, this 
relationship is more pronounced for short-term growth than for medium- to long-
term growth. It follows that the causal direction most likely runs from low growth to 
higher debt levels, not the other way around. 
Another explanation is that, on average, the return on the investments financed by 
this debt compensates their cost. For example, companies take on more debt to 
improve their machinery, which raises their debt level in the short run. However, in 
the longer run, this results in higher productivity and consequently higher profits, 
with the increase in profits offsetting the interest payments on the debt. A similar 
argument can be made for public investments that increase public debt-to-GDP in 
the short run, but improves the long-term economic potential of a country. 
One can also argue that it is not so much the level of debt, or increases in that 
level, which matters. Rather, the cost of servicing debt, i.e. bond yields on both 
corporate and government debt21, plays a far more important role. At lower interest 
                                                                                                         
21 We assume that low levels of corporate and government bond yields are also translated into lower 
levels of interest on consumer loans. 
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rates, it will be easier to service debt. Simultaneously, certain investment projects 
become profitable due to the lower cost of financing it, which results in higher 
growth. Of course, there is a feedback loop between the level of debt and the level 
of interest paid on it, but, ceteris paribus, a lower yields on bonds improves 
investments prospects and hence economic growth. 
We have also looked at the impact of the pace of debt accumulation on subsequent 
economic growth. We find that rapid debt accumulation is negatively related to 
economic growth over the short term, but that this effect is less pronounced over 
the medium term and is non-existent over the long term. This could be explained 
by the fact that countries experiencing a fast rising debt level are typically hit by an 
exogenous shock, which causes the public and private sector to take on more debt 
in the short term, without significantly altering the long-term fundamentals of the 
country. 
In our analysis, we have applied a non-parametric method to demonstrate the 
correlation between debt and growth. The appeal of this method is that the results 
can be interpreted rather intuitively. However, further research is warranted to 
identify the complex structural relationship between total debt levels and GDP 
growth. 
Another area for future research is to decompose the aggregate level of debt in an 
economy in its composing parts and debt holders to find out what type of debt has 
significant impact on economic growth. For example, public debt can be 
disaggregated into internal and external debt, private debt into mortgage debt, 
credit card debt and others. This way, the impact of borrowing in a foreign 
currency, both for the public and private sector, can be studied. 
7. Conclusions 
In summary, this paper has two main contributions. The first is that the current 
emphasis on public debt is too narrow and that private debt should be included in 
analysing the level of indebtedness of an economy. As public and private debt in 
many cases are interchangeable, it is the effect of aggregated debt on growth that 
should be explored. Second, it shows that there is no critical total debt-to-GDP ratio 
after which medium-term economic performance significantly worsens. Hence, the 
excessive focus on a target value such of the debt-to-GDP ratio is misguided. 
There are other, more important factors which determine the impact of debt and 
growth, such as bond yields. An abstract level of debt does not have predictive 
power for the outlook of growth. 
Although we find some evidence that, in the short term, higher debt levels are 
associated with lower growth, the relationship weakens significantly when we 
expand the time horizon. This supports the hypothesis that it is lower growth which 
leads to more debt and not vice versa. Similarly, we find that the pace of debt 
accumulation negatively correlates to short-term economic growth and that this 
relationship weakens for medium-term growth. For long-term growth, the speed at 
which debt is building up does not substantially alter longer-term growth prospects.  
Of course, our results do not imply that a country or the private sector can pile on 
large amounts of debt without careful analysis of the projects financed by this debt 
accumulation. Our research simply suggests that historically, on average, 
government debt and private credit are mainly used in such a way that is conducive 
to economic growth. 
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Appendix 
Descriptive statistics 
Country 
Public Debt 
to GDP 
Private Debt 
to GDP 
Total Debt to 
GDP 
Yearly 
increase in 
total debt 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Australia 23,81% 103,66% 128,36% 2,11% 2,05% 
Austria 44,86% 96,39% 142,33% 3,76% 2,57% 
Belgium 88,24% 132,83% 229,69% 4,71% 2,34% 
Canada 69,22% 129,70% 198,92% 2,49% 2,01% 
Czech Republic 25,58% 69,27% 94,85% 1,40% 1,82% 
Denmark 36,36% 156,07% 192,49% 4,23% 2,01% 
Finland 25,79% 119,74% 149,83% 3,34% 2,68% 
France 39,86% 106,58% 151,33% 3,88% 2,23% 
Germany 42,71% 109,07% 151,96% 2,12% 2,17% 
Greece 65,48% 54,84% 120,78% 5,26% 2,70% 
Hungary 80,91% 86,14% 165,86% 5,42% 1,95% 
Ireland 58,50% 139,23% 201,05% 7,75% 3,42% 
Italy 79,09% 80,27% 159,36% 3,23% 2,27% 
Japan 83,33% 168,83% 256,93% 5,99% 3,46% 
Luxembourg 8,25% 351,04% 363,05% 15,47% 2,74% 
Mexico 38,43% 23,52% 70,57% 0,18% 1,92% 
Netherlands 58,17% 122,26% 180,44% 3,78% 2,11% 
Norway 36,62% 143,06% 181,38% 2,01% 2,61% 
Poland 51,53% 46,08% 94,65% 1,85% 3,77% 
Portugal 45,00% 137,92% 182,92% 5,87% 3,08% 
Spain 36,18% 124,02% 164,03% 4,82% 2,74% 
Sweden 48,24% 148,32% 197,14% 3,53% 2,13% 
Switzerland 45,51% 156,64% 207,46% 2,13% 1,41% 
Turkey 36,78% 26,85% 70,08% 1,53% 4,27% 
United Kingdom  60,39% 111,60% 169,91% 2,39% 2,01% 
United States 55,25% 116,43% 172,02% 2,41% 2,06% 
Average 48,61% 116,51% 168,17% 3,65% 2,48% 
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Database coverage 
Country 
Public Debt to 
GDP 
Private Debt to 
GDP 
Total Debt to 
GDP 
Real GDP per capita 
Growth 
Australia 1961-20121 1961-2012 1961-20121 1961-2012 
Austria 1961-20121 1961-2012 1961-20121 1961-2012 
Belgium 1961-20122 1970-2012 1970-20122 1961-2012 
Canada 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 
Czech Republic 1993-2012 1993-2012 1993-2012 1991-2012 
Denmark 1961-20123 1961-2012 1961-20123 1961-2012 
Finland 1961-20124 1970-2012 1970-20124 1961-2012 
France 1961-20125 1970-2012 1970-20125 1961-2012 
Germany 1961-20126 1961-2012 1961-20126 1961-2012 
Greece 1961-20127 1961-2012 1961-20127 1961-2012 
Hungary 1982-20128 1989-2012 1989-20128 1992-2012 
Ireland 1961-2012 1971-2012 1971-2012 1961-2012 
Italy 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 
Japan 1961-2012 1964-2012 1964-2012 1961-2012 
Luxembourg 1974-20129 2003-2012 2003-2012 1961-2012 
Mexico 1961-201210 1980-2012 1980-201211 1961-2012 
Netherlands 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 
Norway 1961-201212 1961-2012 1961-201212 1961-2012 
Poland 1986-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1991-2012 
Portugal 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 
Spain 1961-201213 1970-2012 1970-2012 1961-2012 
Sweden 1961-201214 1961-2012 1961-201214 1961-2012 
Switzerland 1961-201215 1961-2012 1961-201215 1961-2012 
Turkey 1961-2012 1986-2012 1986-2012 1961-2012 
United Kingdom     1963-2012 1961-2012 1963-2012 1961-2012 
United States 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 1961-2012 
 
1Missing data for 1965. 2Missing data for 1965, 1980, 1981 and 1989. 3Missing data for 1997. 4Missing 
data for 1964-1966, 1979 and 1980. 5Missing data for 1978 and 1979. 6Missing data for 1976. 7Missing 
data for 1976-1978. 8Missing data for 1993 and 1994. 9Missing data for 1990. 10Missing data for 1962-
1964, 1969 and 1981. 11Missing data for 1981. 12Missing data for 1966, 1981 and 1982. 13Missing data 
for 1963 and 1964. 14Missing data for 1965, 1966 and 2003 
15Missing data for 1964-1969 
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Growth performance over 1 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year (h=1 and 
d=1,5,10,15) – outliers removed 
 
Growth performance over 5 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year (h=5 and 
d=1,5,10,15) – outliers removed 
 
Growth performance over 10 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year (h=10 
and d=1,5,10,15) 
 
Growth performance over 10 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year (h=10 
and d=1,5,10,15) – outliers removed 
 
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 1 year
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-25 0 25 50 75
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 5 years
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-50 -25 0 25 50 75 100
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 10 years
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-50 0 50 100 150
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 15 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-15 -5 5 15 25
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 1 year
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-30 -15 0 15 30 45
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 5 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-50 -25 0 25 50 75
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 10 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-30 0 30 60 90 120
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 15 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-20 -10 0 10 20
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 1 year
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-30 -15 0 15 30 45
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 5 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-25 0 25 50 75
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 10 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-30 0 30 60 90
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 15 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-20 -10 0 10 20
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 1 year
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-30 -15 0 15 30 45
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 5 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-25 0 25 50 75
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 10 years
-5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
-30 0 30 60 90
Change in total Debt to GDP (%)
Accumulated over 15 years
European Journal of Government and Economics 4(2)  
 
103 
Growth performance over 10 years with debt accumulation over 1-15 year    (h=10 
and d=1,5,10,15) – Public & private debt 
 
 
Growth performance over 15 year with debt accumulation over 1-15 year (h=15 
and d=1,5,10,15) – outliers removed 
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